

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

A NOTE ON DIODORUS 14.86.1

In 393 B.C. Corinth endured one of the most remarkable, turbulent, and controversial series of events in its history. In quick succession it suffered στάσις among its citizens, with concomitant massacre and political disruption, followed ultimately by amalgamation with Argos.¹ Diodorus (14.86.1) describes the beginning of the incident so: 'Εν δὲ τῇ Κορίνθῳ τινὲς τῶν ἐπιθυμούντων δημοκρατίας συστραφέντες ἀγώνων ὄντων ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ φόνον ἐποίησαν καὶ στάσεως ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν πόλιν. He continues with a much abbreviated account of subsequent events. When the Argives abetted the violence, the Corinthians murdered many leading citizens and exiled others (14.86.1). Coming to the aid of the exiles, the Spartans attacked Lechaëum, whereupon the Boeotians and Athenians intervened in defense of the Argives and the Corinthian malefactors only to be repulsed with heavy losses (14.86.2–4). After the battle both sides claimed the right to preside over the Isthmian Games, with the Spartans successfully upholding the prerogatives of the exiles (14.86.5). Finally, the Argives marched on Corinth and made its territory their own (14.92.1).

The problem in 14.86.1 arises from a phrase that philologists and historians alike usually consider corrupt.² The words τινὲς τῶν ἐπιθυμούντων δημοκρατίας, which Fr. Vogel prints in the Teubner edition, are J. F. Wurm's emendation of τινὲς τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν κρατούντων that appear in the text of all the manuscripts. Wurm's emenda-

1. Diod. 14.86, 92.1; Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.1–13; Plut. *Tim.* 4.4. The chronology of these events is the subject of considerable debate. G. T. Griffith, "The Union of Corinth and Argos (392–386 B.C.)," *Historia* 1 (1950): 236–56, places the στάσις in 392, ἰσοπολιτεία of Corinth and Argos also in 392 and complete unification of the two in 390/89. C. Tuplin, "The Date of the Union of Corinth and Argos," *CQ* 76 (1982): 75–83, argues for a date of 392 for all of them, as does B. S. Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1986), p. 147, n. 62. My date of 393 B.C. is derived from the following: στάσις occurred at the time of the festival of Eucleia, the date of which in Corinth is unknown. K. J. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, 3².2 (Berlin and Leipzig 1923), 219, places the Corinthian festival perhaps in March, on the analogy of the Delphic festival of Eucleia (*SIG²* 438), which was celebrated there either in the second half of Bysios or the first half of Theoxenios. According to G. Roux, *L'Amphictionie, Delphes et le temple d'Apollon au IV^e siècle* (Lyon, 1979), 235, Bysios could fall either in January/February or February/March and Theoxenios in February/March or March/April. The sequence of events then becomes clear from established dates. The battle of Coronea was fought in August 394 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.10; cf. *IG* 2² 5221, 5222), and στάσις took place before Conon rebuilt the Long Walls of Piraeus (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.8–10; cf. Diod. 14.85.2). Athenian inscriptions give the history of the work (cf. also Isoc. 5.64; Dem. 20.68). Construction began in the last month of 395/4 (*IG* 2² 1656) before Conon's return to Athens, and continued upon his arrival in 394/3 (*IG* 2² 1658; line 8 specifically mentions Conon; cf. Nep. *Con.* 4). Conon employed Boeotian stonemasons in the work (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.10; cf. Diod. 14.85.3), and in 394/3 Boeotian contractors aided the work (*IG* 2² 1657 lines 7–8). None of the following inscriptions, *IG* 2² 1658–64, mentions Boeotian workmen. Conon campaigned in the Aegean in 394 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1–6) and 393 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.7–11) before arriving at Piraeus. He was also building walls before the Spartans in 392 had heard of these matters (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12). Therefore, the Corinthian Eucleia in question is that of 393 B.C.

2. Among historians, cf., e.g., D. Kagan, "Corinthian Politics and the Revolution of 392 B.C.," *Historia* 11 (1962): 449; C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca, 1979), 267.

tion, however, is not the only one so far advanced. J. N. Madvig, for instance, proposes τινὲς τῆς δημοκρατίας ἐπιθυμούντων,³ H. Bezzel τινὲς τῶν ἐπικρατούντων τοῦ δήμου,⁴ and J. B. Salmon τινὲς τῶν κρατούντων ἐπὶ θυσιᾷ [sic].⁵ W. E. Thompson rejects Salmon's proposal on the grounds that Diodorus uses κρατούντων as "a military, not a political, term,"⁶ a distinction that seems not to have troubled any of the scribes.

Any emendation involving δημοκρατία or δῆμος likewise immediately raises historical problems too serious to ignore. The suggestions of Wurm, Madvig, and Bezzel would constitute the first and only mention of an organized democratic group in Corinthian politics. G. T. Griffith cites *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (10.3, ed. M. Chambers), τῶν δὲ Κορινθίων οἱ μεταστῆσαι τὰ πράγματα ζητοῦντες, to prove the existence of "democratic revolutionaries" in Corinth.⁷ Yet B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, editors of the *editio princeps* of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, render the passage to mean "partisans of a change of policy," as does Thompson.⁸ The latter are right. The Oxyrhynchus historian never uses πᾶγμα or πράγματα in the sense of "revolution." What he means at 10.3 is precisely what he means at 21.1–2, when he writes that Androcleidas and Hismenias wanted to change Theban policy to rid themselves of a threat from Sparta. In the sixteen times that the Historian uses πράγματα, he invariably means "affairs," "matters," or, in the case of 10.3, "policy."⁹ Griffith's suggestion cannot serve as evidence for the existence of democrats in 393. The difficulties are removed and the situation becomes both coherent in itself and consistent with all available evidence by means of still another emendation of 14.86.1. If the text needs correction, a reasonable proposal is τινὲς τῶν ἐπιθυμούντων κράτους, which makes sense grammatically, stylistically, and historically. It keeps the ἐπιθυμ- and κρατ- of the manuscripts without adding δημο-, and κράτος is used to mean "power."¹⁰ Support for this solution comes from Xenophon and the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, both contemporary historians of this period, Demosthenes, a later fourth-century source, Plutarch, and Pausanias.

Historical evidence is overwhelmingly consistent in portraying Corinthian government as oligarchic from the fall of the Cypselid tyranny to the Argive seizure of the city.¹¹ At the end of the Peloponnesian War, Corinthian politics was in the hands of oligarchs who had become dissatisfied with the Spartan peace settlement. Corinthian discontent with Sparta actually dated back to 421 B.C., when some Corinthians

3. *Adversaria Critica ad Scriptores Graecos et Latinos*, vol. 1 (Copenhagen, 1871–84), 497.

4. *Coniecturae Diodoreae* (Erlangen, 1888), 27.

5. *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford, 1984), 355–57.

6. "The stasis at Corinth," *Studi italiani di filologia classica*, 3d ser., 4 (1986): 161.

7. "Hell. Oxyr. II. 2 sq.," cited in Griffith, "Corinth and Argos," pp. 239 and n. 13, 240, 243, n. 27. D. Kagan, "The Economic Origins of the Corinthian War (395–387 B.C.)," *PP* 16 (1961): 321–41, totally confuses the issue. He first agrees (338) that the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* speaks of "a change of policy," but later (340) refers to the situation as a democratic revolution; cf. also *Historia* 11 (1962): 449–50. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 266–68, accepts Kagan's views.

8. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, 5 (London, 1908): 202; Thompson, "Stasis," 162.

9. M. Chambers, ed., *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1993), 92, s.v. πᾶγμα.

10. LSJ⁹, s.v. κράτος, II. One advantage of a restoration that excludes an intrusive element is that it supports the observation of J. N. O'Sullivan, "On Heliodorus *AETHIOPICA* 7.12.6," *CQ* 71 (1977): p. 240, n. 5, that "It is very noteworthy how seldom scribal error produced a *vox nihili*."

11. Nicolaus of Damascus, *FGrH* 90 F60; F. Jacoby, *FGrH* 2C.250; Hdt. 5.92a–b; Thuc. 3.62.3; A. W. Gomme, *HCT*, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1956), 347; Thuc. 5.31.6; A. W. Gomme et al., *HCT*, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1970), 41; Arist. *Pol.* 5.5.9; Diod. 16.65.6; Plut. *Tim.* 4.4, *Dion* 53.4. G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, 1² (Gotha, 1893), p. 658, n.1; Lenschau, "Korinthos," *RE* Sup. 4 (1924): 1021–29; E. Will, *Korinthiaka* (Paris, 1955), 609–24; Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 231–39.

seriously entertained the notion of abandoning their traditional alliance with Sparta in favor of a new alignment with Argos.¹² Conditions worsened immediately after the war. The Corinthians were galled by the Spartan rejection of their demand to destroy Athens and, even more sorely, by the Spartan refusal to share with them the booty of the war.¹³ The Corinthians immediately expressed their displeasure by refusing to march with the Spartans against the men of the Piraeus and by defying the Spartan decree that all cities surrender the Athenians exiled by the Thirty.¹⁴ The situation deteriorated even further in 400 B.C. when the Corinthians apparently refused to participate in Thibron's expedition to Asia Minor and the Spartan invasion of Elis.¹⁵ In all of these episodes the Corinthians confined themselves solely to the question of foreign policy, and none of these differences had anything to do with the form of Corinthian government. The question of whether the existing constitution should be changed from an oligarchy to a democracy never entered into consideration. Two of the foremost Corinthian oligarchic politicians, men who played leading parts in the στάσις of 393 B.C., prove the point. Timolaus had proven himself a steadfast friend of the Spartans until the end of the Peloponnesian War, but turned against them afterwards for reasons of his own.¹⁶ Polyannes had commanded a Corinthian fleet during the war, but, like Timolaus, thereafter openly opposed the Spartans.¹⁷ Both men remained oligarchs, as did those who supported their foreign policy. All of these people simply wanted and worked for a change of the pro-Spartan policy of Corinth (*Hell. Oxy.* 10.3). That desire became a reality when in 396 B.C. Timocrates of Rhodes, an agent of the Persian satrap Tithraustes, arrived in Corinth, Thebes, Athens, and Argos with money and encouragement to rise against Sparta.¹⁸ After three major battles, the Corinthian War came to rest at Corinth itself, which suffered grievously in the fighting (*Xen. Hell.* 4.4.1). The strain of war, coupled with closer and friendlier relations with the democratic governments of Argos and Athens, played substantial roles in the crisis of 393 B.C. One significant result of that upheaval was the establishment of a democratic government in Corinth and the union of the Corinthian and Argive πόλεις. Yet Corinthian democracy was the result of that turmoil, not the cause of it.¹⁹

For the στάσις and its repercussions, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.4.1–13) provides the earliest and fullest account, and his testimony is in substantial agreement with that of Diodorus and other historians. He states that certain Corinthians, together with the Argives, Athenians, and Boeotians, banded together and began slaughter and στάσις

12. Thuc. 5.17.27–31; H. D. Westlake, "Corinth and the Argive Coalition," *AJPh* 61 (1940): 413–21; Gomme, *HCT*, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1956), 664–70; *HCT* 4:17–30.

13. *Xen. Hell.* 3.3.1; 3.5.5, 12; *Dem.* 24.128–29; *Plut. Lys.* 27.4; *Just. Epit.* 5.10.12. G. A. Lehmann, "Spartas ἀρχή und die Vorphase des Korinthischen Kriegs in den Hellenica Oxyrhynchia I," *ZPE* 28 (1978): 109–26.

14. *Xen. Hell.* 2.4.1–2, 30; cf. 3.5.5.; Aeschin. 2.78, 148; *Diod.* 14.32.1; *Lys.* fr. 78.2; *Plut. Lys.* 27.5–8, *Pel.* 6.5. P. Funke, *Homonoia und Arche* (Wiesbaden, 1980), 48–51.

15. Thibron: *Xen. Hell.* 3.1.4; *Diod.* 14.36.2; Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 342. Elis: *Xen. Hell.* 3.2.25; Paus. 3.8.3. R. Urban, *Der Königsfrieden von 387/86 v. Chr.* (Stuttgart, 1991), 32.

16. *Xen. Hell.* 3.5.1; *Hell. Oxy.* 10.2. Th. Lenschau, "Timolaos," *RE* 6A (1936): 1273–74.

17. *Xen. Hell.* 3.5.1; Paus. 3.9.8. H. Schaefer, "Polyannes," *RE* 21 (1952): 1436–37.

18. See inter alios S. Perlman, "The Causes and Outbreak of the Corinthian War," *CQ* 14 (1964): 64–81; C. D. Hamilton, "The Politics of Revolution in Corinth, 395–386 B.C.," *Historia* 21 (1964): 21–37; and J. E. London, "The Oxyrhynchus Historian and the Origins of the Corinthian War," *Historia* 38 (1989): 300–313.

19. For a full statement of my views on Corinthian politics and political groups during this period, see "Politics at Corinth, 393 BC," in *Text and Tradition: Studies in Greek History and Historiography in Honor of Mortimer Chambers*, ed. L. A. Tritle and R. Mellor (Claremont, 1999, forthcoming).

in the city (Diod. 14.86.1). One hundred and twenty were killed and five hundred exiled (Diod. 14.86.1, not found in Xenophon). There was murder in the theater during the contests (4.4.3; Diod. 14.86.1). The Spartans prepared to help the Corinthian exiles (4.4.2; Diod. 14.86.2), and together they attacked Lechaëum (4.4.7–13; Diod. 14.86.3–4), which was followed by a dispute over the Isthmian Games (4.5.2; Diod. 14.86.5). Diodorus' inclusion of the numbers killed and exiled proves that his source either did not rely solely on Xenophon for his information or that his account was in almost complete agreement with Xenophon's. Once the disputed phrase of 14.86.1 is removed, Diodorus' narrative does not contradict that of Xenophon in any particular.²⁰ There can be no reasonable doubt that both historians are describing the same event. Furthermore, Xenophon, unlike Diodorus, is quite specific about who in Corinth the malefactors were.

Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.4.2) avers that the Corinthians who planned the slaughter were those who had received money from the King—a reference to the mission of Timocrates—and those chiefly responsible for war. Although Hamilton draws a distinction between the two, Thompson handily disproves him.²¹ At 3.5.1 Xenophon also states that the Corinthians who took Persian money were the same men who started the war, with which Pausanias (3.9.8) and Polyaeus (1.48.3; see also *Hell. Oxy.* 10.5) agree. At 5.1.34 Xenophon once again describes them as those who both started the massacre and participated in it. The Oxyrhynchus historian (10.2–3) adds that these men were the anti-Spartans who wanted a change of policy. Taken together, these historians are in full agreement about the identity of those Corinthians who were responsible for the στάσις. They were the same oligarchs who were in power when the war against Sparta was declared. They were neither democrats nor revolutionaries; but since they sought help from the Argives and their other allies, they were obviously pro-Argive.²² Hence, those historians who call them democrats are wrong.

Their opponents too were Corinthian oligarchs who had originally voted for war. Xenophon (4.4.2) describes them as those who turned to peace (τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τετραμμένους). They obviously could not have done so unless they had originally been in favor of war. That means that they were those whom their fellow oligarchs had persuaded—not forced—to go to war.²³ Demosthenes (20.52–53) also speaks of the pro-Spartans in Corinth as the majority who wanted peace.

A nearly exact parallel for events in Corinth comes from Phlius a year later. Sometime before 392 B.C. the Phliasians had exiled some oligarchs who were pro-Spartan (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15). Owing to the depredations of Iphicrates, the Phliasians still in power handed their city to the Spartans in return for protection. While in the city, the

20. Xenophon never gives the total number of Corinthian exiles. All that he says (*Hell.* 4.4.5) is that some of the original refugees returned home, and at 4.4.9 he adds that one hundred and fifty later fought at Lechaëum.

21. Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 263; Thompson, "Stasis," 155–56.

22. Andoc. 3.26–27; Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F77; Paus. 3.9.8.

23. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1–2; *Hell. Oxy.* 26.1; Paus. 3.9.8. Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.4.1, 3) describes the men who wanted peace as οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ βέλτιστοι, which Thompson ("Stasis," 167–68) translates as "most people, including [or: and especially] the aristocrats." For that something stronger than καὶ alone is needed, such as τε . . . καὶ, which Xenophon often uses, as Thompson (156–57) knows; see B. Hammer, *De τε particulae usu Herodoteo, Thucydideo, Xenophonteo* (Leipzig, 1904), 78. Furthermore, since these people were of the same political and social class as the oligarchs who instigated the slaughter, there was no difference in status between them. Rather, Xenophon here uses the term βέλτιστοι in a moral, not a political, sense, which he does commonly throughout his writings: thus *Hell.* 2.3.19; *Mem.* 2.2.6; 3.3.9; 4.8.6–7; *Symp.* 6.9; and *Cyr.* 1.2.15.

Spartans left the constitution untouched and did not restore the exiles. Thus, the whole internal unrest was between oligarchs. After the Corinthian War, some friends of the exiles were also νεωτέρων τινὲς ἐπιθυμοῦντες πραγμάτων (5.2.9). These “newer things” did not mean a change of constitution, for the dispute was finally resolved by a board of one hundred, fifty from those at home and fifty from the exiles, who were determined νόμους θεῖναι, καθ’ οὓς πολιτεύσονται (5.3.25). The reform of the laws is analogous to the Athenian experience of 404 B.C. The Athenians chose men οἱ [τοῦς πατρίους] νόμους συγγράψουσι, καθ’ οὓς πολιτεύσουσι (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2).²⁴ The only difference is that in Athens the ancestral laws were democratic, in Phlius oligarchic. There is absolutely nothing at Phlius to suggest that the dispute had anything to do with democracy. It was rather a split in oligarchic policy.

The same was true of Corinth. The στάσις did not involve a change of constitution, at least not at the outset. Instead, one group of oligarchs was pro-war and pro-allies, while the other was pro-peace and pro-Spartan. All of this points to the obvious conclusion that the entire dispute was a split in policy among Corinthian oligarchs.²⁵ The pro-war Corinthians found themselves in the minority unable to command power by legal means. Being the minority, they resorted to force to maintain their power.²⁶ That amply justifies the description of them as τινὲς τῶν ἐπιθυμούντων κράτους.²⁷

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24. For the entire sequence of events, see C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford, 1952), 285–98; K. R. Walters, “The ‘Ancestral Constitution’ and Fourth-Century Historiography in Athens,” *AJAH* 1 (1976): 129–44; and T. C. Loening, *The Reconciliation Agreement of 404/2 B.C. in Athens* (Stuttgart, 1987).

25. Hence, there is no reason to conclude with Thompson (“*Stasis*,” 142) “that Diodorus (or his source) regards the Corinthian murderers as partisans of democracy.” That opinion depends solely on the emendation that has been rejected.

26. This situation is quite analogous to that obtaining at Thebes, where in 382 B.C. the oligarch Leontides conspired with the Spartan general Phoebidas to suppress Hismenias, his political rival and opponent: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.26–32; Diod. 15.20.2–3; Plut. *Pel.* 5, *Ages.* 23.6–11, *Mor.* 575F; Nep. *Pel.* 1.2–2.1.

27. It is a pleasure to thank Professor David Sansone and the two anonymous readers of *CP* for help in various ways. Any remaining errors are mine alone.

THE HOPE OF THE YEAR: VIRGIL *GEORGICS* 1. 224 AND HESIOD *OPERA ET DIES* 617

In *Georgics* 1 Virgil advises that the farmer not sow before the cosmical setting of the Pleiades (early November) (1.221–24):

ante tibi Eoae Atlantides abscondantur
Cnosiaque ardentis decedat stella Coronae,
debita quam sulcis committas semina quamque
invitae properes anni spem credere terrae.

The correlation of the setting of the Pleiades with sowing and plowing is taken over from Hesiod. Commentators have noted that Virgil incorporates elements from